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This paper provides both theoretical and empirical analyses of market
participants’ optimal decision-making in trading Japanese equity mutual
funds. First, we build an intertemporal decision-making model under
uncertainty in the presence of transaction costs. This setting enables us to
shed light on the investors’ option to delay investment. A comparative
analysis shows that an increase in uncertainty over the expected rate of
return on mutual funds has a negative impact not only on market partici-
pants’ buying behavior but also on their selling behavior. In addition, a
several percent increase in front-end loads and redemption fees is likely to
change the optimal holding ratio of mutual funds in investors’ portfolios,
by up to 10 percent. Second, we empirically examine the theoretical impli-
cations using daily transaction data of selected equity mutual funds in
Japan. By estimating a panel data model, we conclude that for the sample
period, from August 2000 to July 2001, investment behavior has been
rational in light of our theoretical model. Our results suggest that investors
are likely to rationally postpone their purchases of equity mutual funds
under the present circumstances of low expected returns, high degree of
uncertainty, and high trading costs.
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In recent years, demand for financial asset management services has picked up in Japan,
as individuals have increasingly taken diversification of their financial asset holdings
more seriously. In particular, equity mutual funds (hereafter, mutual funds) have
become popular as an investment vehicle with the following features: (1) diversification
effects through portfolio investment; (2) low transaction costs made possible through
scale merits stemming from managing large-scale portfolios; and (3) visibility of 
performance evaluation, which is measured by market prices. Mutual funds are also 
recognized as strategically important products for securities companies and other sales
companies, because they can charge commissions and trading fees on the outstanding
amount of the funds’ net assets. Securities companies can thus enhance their profit-
generating base from one that relies on trading fees generated from each order, or 
flow of trades, to one based on the outstanding amount of each fund’s net assets. 
Contrary to expectations of increasing demand for mutual funds, the total out-
standing amount of equity mutual funds stood at only ¥15 trillion at the end of 
2001 amid the downturn in the Japanese economy and the equity markets. This figure
is much less than the peak of ¥46 trillion at the end of 1989 during the speculative 
bubble period. In addition, demand for bond mutual funds, which had been on a
steady rise, has recently waned. Investors have been selling these funds, as they lost 
confidence in the performance of these funds after some money market funds 
(MMFs) marked negative returns (Figure 1).
1
These events highlighted the risks associated with mutual funds in Japan, leading to
various attempts to examine the points at issue surrounding mutual funds in Japan.
Most existing studies, however, have focused on ex post performance reviews of mutual
funds.
2 Studies directly focusing on investors’ trading behavior have been rare.
3
Also, arguments in this area seem confused, partly because understanding of investors’
decision-making is still shallow. That is, on one hand, investors are called upon to be
more responsible for their investments, and this tendency is increasing the importance
of investor education. On the other hand, the typical investment guideline, stating 
that ideal asset management is to buy and hold assets over long periods almost blindly,
no matter how market conditions change, seems to be widely accepted.
To shed light on how investors decide when to trade mutual funds, this paper
models the decision-making process of an investor who optimizes his or her asset
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1. On September 17, 2001, the Meiji-Dresdner MMF marked negative returns due to the default of the Mycal
Group. On November 29, 2001, the MMFs of four companies, including Nikko Asset Management and UFJ
Partners, also recorded negative returns.
2. Cai, Chan, and Yamada (1997) find that Jensen’s  , which, in loose terms, represents the profits from mutual
funds, takes a significantly negative value by examining the performance of domestic equity mutual funds with
multi-factor models. Such results may explain the low performance of domestic equity mutual funds in Japan,
dubbed the “Japanese open-end puzzle” (Brown et al. [2001]). A recent study by Takehara and Yano (2001), 
however, find that these empirical results need some reservations in terms of statistical robustness. They show that
the results may change depending on which variables are used as independent variables by estimating a similar
model using the data from 1995, in which reforms in mutual funds regulation were launched. See Takayama
(2000) for a comprehensive survey in this area.
3. Although such studies are not extensively done in Japan, that is not the case in the United States and European 
countries. Literature includes Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Gruber (1996), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and 
Zheng (1999).holdings over a long-term horizon. Our model follows the dynamic asset allocation
model of Constantinides (1986) and Dumas and Luciano (1991). Use of the dynamic
model enables us to analyze investors’ optimal timing in trading mutual funds and thus
explore effects of transaction costs and uncertainty over expected returns on investors’
trading strategies.
4 That is, investors have the option to not only choose between
trading and not trading “immediately,” but also delay trading, which we will call the
“option to wait.” As a corollary to financial options, trading costs and uncertainty
over returns are expected to have a large impact on the value of the option to wait.
Here, we should note the importance of distinguishing between two types of costs:
(1) the costs imposed in each holding period, which change the equilibrium ratio of
mutual fund holdings; and (2) the trading costs imposed when buying and selling
mutual funds, which determine the timing of trading. In fact, we observe an upward
revision trend for various transaction costs associated with equity mutual funds 
in Japan (Figure 2 and the Appendix).
5 Also, the volatility of the Tokyo Stock 
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4. As described later in Section III, in most existing studies, various transaction costs are lumped together and just
subtracted from total returns for convenience, regardless of when they are actually charged. 
5. Deregulation in the mutual fund industry has moved forward since the 1990s. For example, (1) foreign mutual
funds were allowed to enter the Japanese markets in the early 1990s, and (2) authorized sellers, formerly restricted
to securities companies, were expanded to include banks and investment funds in the second half of the 1990s.
Foreign mutual funds, however, continued to promote products attractive to securities companies, aiming to
increase their market share by making full use of their existing branch network and strong sales forces. This may
partly explain why front-end loads continued on an upward trend. Note here that the results shown in Figure 2
cover only those for general domestic equity mutual funds and are averages across funds. As such, the increase in
Figure 1  Net Outstanding Amount of Mutual Funds
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Price Index (TOPIX) seems to be higher recently (Figure 3).
6 This paper explores 
how these changes influence investors’ trading behavior for mutual funds under the
framework of dynamic asset allocation.
Furthermore, we will take one step forward to empirically examine the theoretical
implications derived by our model. To this end, we will construct three fund flow
indicators, (1) a turnover ratio, (2) a buying ratio, and (3) a selling ratio as dependent
variables in a panel data model where we control other factors specific to each fund. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the theoretical model.
Section III provides the results and implications of the theoretical model. Section IV
estimates the empirical model, and Section V summarizes the implications of the
empirical results. Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. Modeling Investor Behavior
A. The Model
In this section, we build a dynamic optimization model to analyze mutual fund
investment strategies based on Constantinides (1986), and Dumas and Luciano
average front-end fees amid the recent introduction of no-load funds would lead to the observation that the load
funds are generally charging higher fees and that the range of fees is becoming wider. In addition, various types of
discounts are given to attract investors.
6. Since there is no appropriate benchmark performance indicator for the entire equity mutual fund population, 
we use the volatility of the TOPIX as a proxy. Note that the uncertainty over future performance is important 
in this context and not the historical volatility. Therefore, we estimate the conditional standard deviation of 
daily returns on the TOPIX by GARCH (1, 1) in addition to the historical volatility of the TOPIX over the past
60 days. But we found no significant differences between the two volatility measures. (1991).
7 The underlying assumptions are as follows. A representative investor’s 
portfolio comprises two types of assets: risk-free assets and risky mutual funds.
8 The
investor rebalances his or her portfolio by buying and selling mutual funds to keep
the portfolio allocation in a certain optimal range.
9 The investor gains utility by 
consuming a fixed proportion of his or her risk-free assets. The investor is risk-averse,
and his or her utility function in each period is C(t)
 / , with the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion   ˆ ≡ (1 −  )
10 held constant, where C(t) represents consumption
in period t. The investor makes investment decisions to maximize the discounted
value of the future stream of expected utility. We define the investor’s maximum
expected utility U as
95
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7. Both Constantinides (1986) and Dumas and Luciano (1991) assume that trading costs are equal when buying 
and selling assets. In reality, however, front-end loads and redemption fees differ depending on mutual funds.
Therefore, we will allow for the differences in costs in our model.
8. In reality, a portfolio will likely be composed of more than two assets. But the two-asset model will adequately
convey the essence of dynamic investment behavior in the presence of trading costs. For example, Leland (2000)
derives similar results in a multiple asset setting, but the model is far less tractable.
9. Keeping the proportion of each asset ina certain range becomes the optimal strategy because we allow for both uncer-
tainty over expected returns and the existence of transaction costs. We will elucidate this point in Section III, where
we run some comparative static analyses. The model in this paper is consistent with actual transactions, where buying
and selling of mutual funds will entail certain costs: front-end loads and redemption fees, respectively. Meanwhile,
typical dynamic portfolio selection models such as the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) assume
a frictionless market with no trading costs for the sake of convenience. As a result, we can solve for a unique 
equilibrium proportion of asset holdings, which investors maintain throughout their time horizon. Under this 
setup, investors promptly rebalance their asset allocation once the allocation deviates from the optimal one. Naturally,
if the rebalancing costs in the model,  1 and  2, are assumed to be zero, the results will coincide with the ICAPM.
10. We assume   < 1 (≠ 0), or by definition,   ˆ > 0.
  C(t)
   U = max E0 ∫e
− t—— –dt , (1)
0   
with   being a constant discount rate.
In addition, the outstanding amount of mutual funds held by the investor is
denoted as V M, and risk-free assets, V F. When trading does not take place, V M follows
a geometric Brownian motion, and V F grows at a constant rate of r, as shown in
equations (2) and (3):
dVM = ( M −  C)VMdt +  MVMdz, (2)
dVF = rVFdt −Cdt = (r −  )VFdt, (3)
where   M denotes the drift parameter of VM,   C the administrative fees,  M the 
standard deviation parameter, and dz(=   √dt
—
,    ∼ N(0, 1)) the increment of a
Wiener process. We further assume that the investor consumes a fixed proportion 
  of his or her risk-free assets each period. This simplified rule is also adopted 
in Constantinides (1986).
11 Therefore, consumption in each period can be written as
C ≡  VF, and the dynamics of VF lead to equation (3).
B. Boundary Conditions for Trading Mutual Funds
In this subsection, we derive the optimal range of mutual fund holdings. In the
absence of trading costs, the optimal strategy is to trade the necessary amount 
of mutual funds whenever the asset allocation deviates from its optimal state (see 
also Footnote 10). In the presence of trading costs, however, the trade-off between
(1) paying the costs accumulated through rebalancing the investor’s portfolio and 
(2) the opportunity costs stemming from deviation from its optimal state matters 
for the investor. Note that without trading costs, the investor need not consider the
former.
12 This trade-off causes the investor to temporarily allow his or her portfolio
allocations to deviate from the optimal state. Thus, the investor would keep the 
ratio of mutual fund holdings within an optimal range, rather than target a single
optimum ratio. Figure 4 shows this behavior. 
We now model the portfolio rebalancing behavior mathematically. Let   ≡VM/VF
denote the ratio of mutual fund holdings to risk-free asset holdings, both of which
are in terms of marked-to-market values, and let   – and   – denote the upper and lower
boundaries. Then, when   – ≤   ≤   –, the investor neither buys nor sells mutual funds,
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11. In this paper, we calculate   from the optimal portfolio allocations derived by the ICAPM (see Footnote 10) and
consumption schedule. Constantinides (1986) uses a slightly different method, solving for   that maximizes the
investor’s utility after giving the optimal portfolio allocations derived by the ICAPM. However, he points out that
(1) imposing trading costs generates both a substitution and income effect on  , and which effect dominates is not
a priori obvious, (2) simulation results show a small effect of trading costs on  , and (3) changes in the parameters
such as risk aversion and uncertainty over the risky asset’s expected return have the same qualitative effects on  , with
or without trading costs. Therefore, our treatment of   should not detract from our analysis of investor behavior.
12. Leland (2000) models this trade-off explicitly. In his models, he defines “tracking error” as the difference between
the investor’s utility from an optimal portfolio and that from a non-optimal one. The investor’s goal is to minimize
his loss function, which is defined as the sum of the tracking error and trading costs in rebalancing.letting the ratio of mutual fund holdings fluctuate according to the dynamics
described by equations (2) and (3). Moreover, the following no-arbitrage condition
(4) holds for the maximum expected utility U.
13 Applying Ito’s Lemma to equation
(4), we get equation (5):
97
Optimal Timing in Trading Japanese Equity Mutual Funds: Theory and Evidence
13. Just multiplying both sides of the following Bellman equation by (1 +   t)/ t and letting  t go to zero yields
equation (4), which is a continuous-time version of the equation below:
C(VF,VM, ,t)
  1         U(VF,VM,t) = max—————— t + ———–E[U(VF′, VM′,t +  t) VF,VM,  ], 
     1 +   t 
Figure 4  Dynamic Investor Behavior 
Ratio of mutual 
fund holdings
Optimal ratio of mutual fund
holdings before changes
in expected returns
Optimal ratio of mutual
fund holdings after changes
in expected returns








Actual path of mutual
fund holdings
Optimal ratio after changes
in expected returns
Changes in expected returns
[1] With No Trading Costs
[2] With Trading Costs
Note: Light-colored arrows denote buying of mutual funds, and shaded arrows denote
selling of mutual funds.
Note: Light-colored arrows denote buying of mutual funds, shaded arrows denote selling
of mutual funds, and the shaded band denotes the optimal holding range.C
  1  ρU(VF,VM) = —–  + — –E[dU(VF,VM)], (4)   dt
C
   M
2
— – + (rVF −C)UF + (  −  C)VMUM + — –VM
2UMM −  U = 0, (5)   2  
where UF ≡  U/ VF,UM ≡  U/ VM, andUMM ≡  U
2/ 
2VM. 
When   reaches the lower boundary   –, the investor buys additional mutual funds
to raise  . Conversely, when   reaches the upper boundary   –, the investor lowers   by
selling part of his or her mutual fund holdings. We can incorporate this behavior into
our model by imposing boundary conditions on equations (4) or (5) in the following
manner. At the lower boundary   –, the investor will sell (1 +  1)dL units of risk-free
assets, and buy dL units of mutual funds,
14 where  1 represents the front-end loads
charged when the investor buys mutual funds. This also implies that the amount of
total assets will decrease by  1dL. For the dynamic optimal conditions to be satisfied,
however, no jumps are allowed in the investor’s utility level before and after rebalanc-
ing the portfolio. Therefore, equation (6-1) must hold at   –. Equation (6-1) states
that utility lies on a single indifference curve, regardless of changes in VF and VM,
which implies that equation (6-1) is equivalent to equation (6-2): 
U(VF ––,VM –– ) =U(VF –– − (1 +  1)dL,VM –– + dL), (6-1)
(1 +  1)UF(VF ––,VM –– ) = UM(VF ––,VM –– ), (6-2)
where VF –– andVM –– denote risk-free asset and mutual fund holdings at   –, respectively.
Note that VF –– andVM –– satisfy   – =VM –– /VF –– . 
We can derive the following equations (7-1) and (7-2) for the upper boundary   –






+ (1 −  2)dH, VM
––
−dH ), (7-1)















as above, and  2 denotes the redemption fees,
and dH the amount of mutual funds sold when   reaches   –.
15 Equations (6) and 
(7) are called “value-matching conditions.” To completely characterize the optimal
trading strategy, we need additional conditions (8) and (9): 
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where   denotes the switching parameter that represents the choice of whether or not to rebalance and VF′ and
VM′ denote the states of VF andVM after time period  t. The left-hand side of equation (4) is the total return in
terms of utility the investor would require over an infinitesimal time period, discounted by  . The right-hand
side is the expected total return over an infinitesimal time period, the first term being income gain, and the second
term being the capital gain or loss if negative. In this sense, the equality represents a no-arbitrage condition.
14. The amount of mutual funds bought at the lower boundary   – is infinitesimal, as with the amount sold at the
upper boundary  
–
. This is because the trading costs we consider here are proportional to the trading volume so
that the minimum amount of reallocation inherently becomes the optimum strategy. On the other hand, given
lump-sum trading costs, incentives to rebalance assets on a larger scale will arise.
15. We can incorporate trading behavior into equations (2) and (3) to obtain the following equations (2′) and (3′).
These equations are called “regulated geometric Brownian motion”:−(1 +  1)UFF(VF ––,VM –– ) +UFM(VF ––,VM –– ) (8) =−(1 +  1)UMF(VF ––,VM –– ) +UMM(VF ––,VM –– ) = 0, 













––) = 0. 
These are the “smooth-pasting conditions.”
16 These conditions ensure that no 
intertemporal arbitrage opportunities exist, and together with the value-matching
conditions, we can pin down the optimal boundaries, i.e., the optimal range of
mutual fund holdings. 
To sum up, the optimal boundaries can be obtained by solving the partial differ-
ential equation (6) subject to boundary conditions (6) through (9). Note that since
U(VF,VM) is homogeneous of degree  :
VM U(VF,VM) ≡VF
 u(—– ) =VF
 u( ). (10) 
VF
Hence, we can substitute equation (10) into (5) to obtain the following ordinary 
differential equation (11), which is much easier to handle: 
1     — M
2 
2u′′( ) + (  −  C − r +  ) u′( ) − {  −  (r −  )}u( ) 
2     
 
γ
+ — – = 0. (11) γ
Equation (11) has the general solution: 
 
γ
—————— – +A1 
s1 +A2 
s2, (12)
γ{  −  (r −  )}   
where A1 and A2are free parameters to be determined, and s1 and s2 are the roots of





2 + (  −  C − r +   − —– )s − {  −  (r −  )} = 0. (13)
2                                      2  
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dVM = ( M −  C)VMdt +  MVMdz + dL − dH,( 2 ′)
dVF = (r −  )VFdt + (1 −  2)dH − (1 +  1)dL,( 3 ′)
where dL is positive when   =   – (zero otherwise), and dH is positive when   =  
–
(zero otherwise).
16. In mathematical terms, smooth-pasting conditions require the derivatives of the value function (or utility function
in our model) to take the same value at the boundary. Generally, smooth-pasting conditions are expressed by the
first derivative of the value function, but when they are expressed by the second derivative as in equations (8) and
(9), they are labeled “super-contact conditions.” See Dumas (1991) for details.Note that conditions (6) to (9) can be rewritten in terms of   using equation (10).
Thus, substituting equation (12) into the rewritten expressions of (6) to (9) yields the
following equations: 
(1+  1){1 + a1(  − s1)  –
s1 + a2(  − s2)  –
s2}
= a1s1  –
s1−1 + a2s2  –
s2−1, (14)
(1−  2){1 + a1(  − s1)  –s1 + a2(  − s2)  –s2}
= a1s1  –s1−1 + a2s2  –s2−1, (15)
−(1+  1)
2{  − 1+ a1(  − s1)(  − s1− 1)  –
s1
+ a2(  − s2)(  − s2 − 1)  –
s2}
+ (1+  1){a1(  − s1)s1  –
s1−1 + a2(  − s2)s2  –
s2−1} (16)
= {a1s1(s1 − 1)  –
s1−2 + a 2s2(s2 − 1)  –
s2−2} 
− (1+  1){a1(  − s1)s1  –
s1−1 + a2(  − s2)s2  –
s2−1} = 0,
(1−  2)
2{  − 1 + a1(  − s1)(  − s1− 1)  –s1
+ a2(  − s2)(  − s2 − 1)  –s2} 
−(1−  2){a1(  − s1)s1  –s1−1 + a2(  − s2)s2  –s2−1} (17)
=− {a1s1(s1 − 1)  –s1−2 + a2s2(s2 − 1)  –s2−2} 
+ (1−  2){a1(  − s1)s1  –s1−1 + a2(  − s2)s2  –s2−1} = 0,
where a1 ≡ A1{  −  (r −  )}/ 
 , and a2 ≡ A2{  −  (r −  )}/ 
 . We can find a solution
for a1, a2,   –, and   – using numerical methods.
17
III. Theoretical Implications
A. Comparative Analysis of the Model 
In this section, we intuitively discuss the effects of the model parameters on mutual
fund investment behavior by showing results of the comparative analysis (summa-
rized in Figures 5 and 6).
18 Instead of analyzing   as such, we define the ratio of
mutual fund holdings to total asset holdings as   ≡  /(1 +  ) (hereafter, the ratio of
mutual fund holdings) and focus on its response to changes in the model parameters.
1. Front-end loads and redemption fees ( 1,  2)
a. Similarities
Results show that these trading costs influence the investor’s behavior in the following
two ways. First, the presence of the costs ( 1,  2) creates an optimal range of mutual
fund holdings as mentioned in the previous section. In other words, when trading 
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17. We use the Levenberg-Marquardt method included in Mathcad 2001 as a solving algorithm.
18. The baseline values of parameters are set as follows:
r = 0.5 percent,  M = 4 percent,  M = 18 percent,   =− 1,   = 12 percent,  1 = 2 percent,  2 = 1 percent, 
 C = 1.5 percent. 
We conduct our analysis by varying each parameter in the following ranges while fixing the other parameters 
at their base values:  M(0 to 5 percent),  M(10 to 30 percent),  (−5 to −1),  1,  2,  C(0 to 4 percent each).
Although the values are set somewhat arbitrarily, we think that they are as realistic as possible.101
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Note: Baseline values of parameters: r = 0.5 percent,  M = 4 percent,  M = 18 percent, 
  = –1,   = 12 percent,  1 = 2 percent,  2 = 1 percent, and  C = 1.5 percent.
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Note: Baseline values of parameters: r = 0.5 percent,  M = 4 percent,  M = 18 percent, 
  = –1,   = 12 percent,  1 = 2 percent,  2 = 1 percent, and  C = 1.5 percent.




























































































































































































































































































































































Optimal holding ratio 
without costs
Optimal holding range in the 
presence of trading costs
Optimal holding ratio with 
administrative fees
Optimal holding ratio 
without costs
Optimal holding range in the 
presence of trading costs
Optimal holding ratio 
with administrative 
fees
Optimal holding ratio 
without costs
Optimal holding range in the 
presence of trading costs
Optimal holding ratio with 
administrative feescosts increase, the investor becomes more reluctant to trade mutual funds even if his or
her holdings deviate from the optimal level. Thus, front-end loads and redemption fees
are possible factors that inhibit mutual fund transactions, but are not directly to blame 
for the low ratio of mutual fund holdings in the investor’s portfolio. In fact, when the
market values of mutual funds increase, the share of mutual fund holdings may be
maintained at a higher level than in the case with no trading costs. 
Second, the optimal mutual fund holdings decrease on average in the presence of
trading costs. This can be confirmed by our numerical results that show both trading
costs shift the no-transaction region toward risk-free asset holdings.
19
b. Differences
Depending on the timing of imposition, even the same amount of trading costs 
creates a different range of optimal mutual fund holdings. To be specific, an increase
in selling costs shifts the upper boundary further upward, while it shifts the lower
boundary less downward than an increase in buying costs. Thus, imposing front-end
loads tends to have a larger negative impact on the average optimal mutual fund
holdings than redemption fees. 
2. Administrative and management fees ( C)
Administrative and management fees are imposed throughout the holding periods.
Imposition of these fees has a qualitatively different impact on the investor’s dynamic
asset allocation strategies from the trading costs we discussed above. Since the fees are
not costs in rebalancing the portfolio, they do not create incentives to delay trading
mutual funds when mutual fund holdings deviate from the optimal state. In other
words, imposing these fees does not change the investor’s trading strategy from that
taken in a frictionless market, which is to always rebalance to keep his or her port-
folio allocation precisely at the optimal level. Rather, these fees directly diminish the
mutual fund’s net rate of return, causing a downward shift in the optimal ratio of
mutual fund holdings. Our results show that a 1 percent increase in  C reduces   by
up to 10 percent. Thus, the investor’s trading behavior is quite elastic to changes in
administrative and management fees.
Figure 7 reports results of a supplementary analysis conducted to clarify the effects
of the various transaction costs on mutual fund holding behavior. Table 1 provides
some numerical examples. 
3. Expected rate of return on mutual funds ( M)
An increase in the expected rate of return on mutual funds has a positive effect on the
optimal ratio of mutual fund holdings, which is basically the same effect as a decrease
in administrative and management fees. Our results show that a 1 percent increase 
in  M generates a 10 percent increase in  . As is the case with administrative and
management fees, the investor’s behavior responds substantially to changes in the
expected rate of mutual fund returns. 
103
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19. Our model is biased toward holding risk-free assets due to the assumption that consumption, which the investor
tries to maximize, is a fixed percentage of risk-free assets. The model of Dumas and Luciano (1991) avoids this
bias by assuming that the investor gains utility from his total asset holdings at a certain terminal date. It should
be noted, however, that the setup of Constantinides (1986) might be a more natural representation of indi-
viduals’ behavior. In consuming, an individual investor is likely to withdraw part of his risk-free assets such as
postal savings or bank deposits, which can usually be traded at minimum cost, instead of mutual funds, which are
likely to involve certain costs, explicit or implicit.4. Uncertainty over the expected rate of mutual fund returns ( M)
In our model, uncertainty over the expected rate of mutual fund returns has a nega-
tive effect on mutual fund holdings. One of the reasons is straightforward. Provided
the expected rates of return are the same among assets, the risk-averse investor 
obviously withdraws from holding riskier assets. This also holds for the case with
costless markets. 
Also, trading costs play a significant role in amplifying this effect. The theory of
investment decisions under uncertainty in the presence of sunk costs
20 states that firms
have the option to delay their investment decisions until uncertainty over future returns
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Optimal holding range 
with buying costs
Optimal holding ratio 
without costs
Optimal holding range 
with selling costs
Optimal holding ratio with 
administrative fees
1,  2,  C    
Table 1  Numerical Examples (Cost Change from Zero Percent to 3 Percent)
Percent
Front-end loads ( 1) Redemption fees ( 2)
Administrative and 
management fees ( C)
Change in upper  54  →56.5 ↑ 54  →57.3 ↑ 54  → 7.7 ↓
boundary +2.5 +3.3 −46.3
Change in optimal  54  → 54 → 54  → 54 → 54  → 7.7 ↓
holding ratio ±0 ±0 −46.3
Change in lower  54  →47.4 ↓ 54  →48.1 ↓ 54  → 7.7 ↓
boundary −6.6 −5.9 −46.3
Notes: 1. Baseline values of parameters: r = 0.5 percent,  M = 4 percent,  M = 18 percent,   = –1, 
  = 12 percent, and  1 =  2 =  C = 0 percent.
2. Shadows show the existence of an optimal range in holding mutual funds.
20. One example of the representative literature in this field is Dixit and Pindyck (1994). dissolves at least to some extent. In this setup, an increase in uncertainty will boost 
the value of the firms’ “waiting option,” which raises the lower boundary of optimal
investment, inducing a stronger incentive to delay. The mechanism through which
trading costs influence mutual fund investment can be similarly interpreted. In our
model, the investor has an option to rebalance his or her portfolio. By exercising this
option by paying the costs, the investor can obtain utility from the optimally rebalanced
portfolio minus utility from the pre-rebalanced portfolio (in other words, the oppor-
tunity cost of delaying rebalance). The opportunity cost of delaying rebalance, Oc, is









   Oct = Et ∫e
− ( −t)(——————— —)d  , (18)
t   
F0 = max[E0[Oct]e
− t, 0]    − Oc 0 .      (19)     
t
“Wait” until the optimal timing t to rebalance Rebalanced immediately
Here, C
*
+rebalance denotes the maximum consumption flow that can be obtained through
optimal rebalancing, and C
*
−rebalance denotes the consumption flow that can be obtained
without rebalancing.   in equation (19) denotes the discount rate, and other notations
follow those in the previous section. Note that the first term on the right-hand side of
equation (19) is an expression analogous to that of an American call option.
In line with the discussion above, the increase in uncertainty over mutual fund
returns boosts the “waiting option” value F0, inducing a greater incentive to delay 
rebalancing. Thus, the investor becomes more reluctant to both buy and sell mutual
funds. Together with the effects of the investor’s risk-averseness and the bias toward
risk-free assets ascribed to the investor’s consumption schedule, our model suggests 
substantially negative total effects of uncertainty on mutual fund holdings. In 
addition, the downward shift of the lower boundary of optimal mutual fund holdings
is likely to exceed that of the upper boundary. Figure 8 provides an intuitive image. Our
numerical analysis shows that the upper and lower boundaries shift downward by 
45 percentage points (69 → 24 percent) and 49 percentage points (63 → 14 percent),
respectively, in response to a 10 percentage point increase (12 → 22 percent) in  M. 
5. Relative risk-averseness (  ˆ)
When the investor is more risk-averse, the investor will demand a higher return 
for taking the same risk. Therefore, the optimal ratio of mutual fund holdings 
should fall, other things equal. Determining its magnitude is not easy, however, since
preceding studies are quite mixed over the values of estimated coefficient of relative
risk aversion   ˆ.
22
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21. Note that the equations describe the investor’s decision to purchase mutual funds, but we can derive a similar 
expression for selling.
22. Typically,   ˆ is estimated using the following method introduced by Friend and Blume (1975). They define   ˆ as
  ˆ ≡ (E[rr] − rs)/(  ), where E[rr] is the expected return on the risky asset, rs the return on the risk-free asset, 
  the standard deviation of rr, and   the share of risk assets. Estimation results of   ˆ vary depending on the data 
as well as the formula used to calculate E[rr]. For example,   ˆ is estimated as around 2 to 4 using a household 
data sample from 1987 to 1995 by Muramoto (1998), around 0.4 to 1.6 using the sample from 1987 to 1997 by
the Economic Planning Agency (1999), around 11 to 18 using a household sample from 1985 to 1997, or












B. Issues Associated with Evaluating the Cost Burden in Trading Mutual Funds
Now we will discuss the significance of adopting a multi-period optimization frame-
work by providing some numerical examples. Mutual fund holdings usually incur
different types of costs at each phase of trading, namely, buying, holding, and selling.
However, it is often assumed that all the relevant costs can merge into a single cost
measure. A typical method of constructing such a “total cost measure” is to first
assume an investment period, and then evenly distribute buying and selling costs
across the period. In other words, this method intends to treat these costs as holding
costs. For example, if the front-end loads are 3 percent and the administrative fees are
2 percent annually, the front-end loads are treated as 1 percent annual (3 percent
divided by three years) administrative fees. Therefore, the annual total cost turns out
to be 3 percent (1 percent plus 2 percent).
23
To allow for this simplified treatment, the investment horizon must be an exoge-
nous constant. However, it is natural to assume that the optimal investment period is
endogenously determined and flexibly revised depending on the market environment.
In this regard, we can utilize our model
24 to clarify the caveats of such a “total cost 
measure approach,” which converts buying and selling costs into holding costs that are
thought of as a discount in the expected rate of mutual fund return.
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Increase in uncertainty (   ) M  
Average holding ratio in the 
presence of trading costs
Optimal holding ratio under zero 
trading costs and uncertainty
Optimal holding ratio in the 
presence of trading costs (1) Risk averseness 
lowers the optimal 
holding ratio
(2) A further bias toward 
risk-free assets in 
the presence of 
trading costs
23. This is the basic idea of the “total sharehold cost measure” used by the U.S. Investment Company Institute. 
See Rea and Reid (1998) for details.
24. See Constantinides (1986) for details of the method. It should be noted, however, that he has restricted his 
discussion to measuring liquidity premiums, while we adopt a somewhat different interpretation, using the model
to convert one-time buying and selling costs into periodic discounts under a dynamic optimization setup.Consider the case where an investor endowed with only risk-free assets buys
mutual funds entailing front-end loads. Since the costs are proportional to the pur-
chased amount, the optimal strategy is to buy as little as possible. Thus, the investor
will buy just enough to satisfy the lower boundary of the optimal ratio of mutual
fund holdings. 
To evaluate the cost burden of the front-end loads that are evenly distributed 
over the holding time (note that our model assumes an infinite horizon), we need to
calculate how much of a discount the expected rate of mutual fund return requires 
to balance between the maximum expected utility when the investor is subjected to
front-end loads, and that gained without loads. 
Now suppose the investor’s portfolio consists of only risk-free assets VF,0. Then 
the investor rationally buys mutual funds up to the lower boundary of the optimal
holding range. After this trading, the investor will have mutual funds VM ––, which 
satisfies equation (20):
  –VF,0 VM –– = —————–, (20)
1 + (1+  1)  –
and risk-free assets VF –– , which satisfies equation (21):
VF,0 VF –– =VF,0 − (1+  1)VM –– = ————— —. (21)
1 + (1+  1)  –
We further assume that the following equation holds: 




U(VF ––,VM –– ) = (——–)  −  r − ———————— —  ——–, 
 1 −    2(1 − ) M
2   
(22)
where   denotes the discount rate we try to calculate. The left-hand side of equation
(22) shows the maximum expected utility the investor can gain when the investor
pays front-end loads to construct his or her portfolio at the lower boundary of the
optimal range of mutual fund holdings. The right-hand side shows the maximum
expected utility from the same portfolio in the absence of the loads.
25 Equation (22)
can be rewritten as equation (23), using equations (20), (21), and (10):
u(  –)        1      ( M −  C −   − r)
2  
 −1 1 —————— — = (——–)   −  r − ———————— — —.
{1 + (1 +  1)  –}
   1 −    2(1 −  ) M
2   
(23)
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25. The ICAPM (see Footnote 10) shows that the maximum expected utility, J, is expressed as follows (also see
Merton [1973] for details):




J = (—— —)  −  r − ———— —–  —— –.  
 1 −    2(1 −  ) 
2   Now we can solve for   using   – in equation (23) as the lower boundary calculated in
Section II. Note that equations (22) and (23) show that   is endogenously deter-
mined by such variables as the investor’s risk-averseness and uncertainty over the
mutual fund’s expected returns. For example, an increase in uncertainty over mutual
fund returns implies a higher frequency of rebalancing and associated payment of
trading costs. This raises  . We are likely to underestimate   if we simply calculate it
by distributing trading costs across some exogenous holding period, since we neglect
the possibility of any additional payments associated with rebalancing in the future.
Table 2 provides some numerical examples. 
The results in Table 2 show that the converted front-end loads   may be as high
as 40 basis points depending on the level of uncertainty.
26 As we assume an infinite
investment horizon,   will be approximately zero if we calculate according to the
typical over-simplified method. Therefore, the figures we have presented in Table 2
can be interpreted as an additional discount due to the consideration of multi-period
optimization strategy with rebalancing. 
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Table 2  Relationship between   and Uncertainty over Expected Returns
Percent
 M
15 20 25 30
Discount rate ( ) (annualized) 0.28 0.32 0.36 0.40
Note: Baseline values of parameters: r = 0.5 percent,  M = 4 percent,   = –1,   = 12 percent, 
 1 =  2 = 2 percent, and  C = 1.5 percent.
From this equation, we can derive the right-hand side of equation (22) simply by substituting (1) the discounted
expected return on mutual funds net of administrative fees for the expected return on assets,  , in the above 
equation, and (2) the amount of risk-free assets the investor is initially endowed with, VF,0 for the total asset amount,
W0. Note that the total asset value remains VF,0 on the right-hand side of equation (22), which corresponds to the
case of no loads. However, on the left-hand side, where we assume loads are imposed, the amount of total assets is
smaller than the initial endowment as indicated below: 
1 +   – VF –– + VM –– = ————— — –VF,0 < VF,0. 
1 + (1 +  1)  –
26. Constantinides (1986) concludes that the discount rate thus estimated has a second-order effect on equilibrium
asset returns. Considering the current extremely low interest rate environment in Japan, however, we think the
figures are not negligible.
IV. Empirical Analyses
A. Hypotheses
This section presents hypotheses to be tested using the data of Japanese equity
mutual funds. To that end, we construct the following three fund flow indicators: 
(1) a mutual fund’s buying ratio, which is the amount of each fund bought divided
by the fund’s net asset value; (2) a selling ratio, the amount sold divided by the fund’s
net asset value; and (3) a turnover ratio, the sum of the buying and the selling ratios.
Our hypotheses are described below. 1. Hypothesis A: How do costs and uncertainty influence the turnover ratio? 
As discussed in Sections II and III, when front-end loads and redemption fees are
imposed, the best strategy will be to allow for certain deviation from the optimal
asset allocation, reducing the frequency of rebalancing compared with the case of no
trading costs. To see if this theoretical hypothesis empirically holds, we will test
whether trading costs are negatively correlated with the turnover ratio.
Our model cannot determine the relationship between uncertainty and the turnover
ratio, because an increase in uncertainty over returns has two offsetting effects on the
turnover ratio. One increases the value of the investor’s “option to delay rebalancing,”
which lowers the turnover ratio. The other diminishes the mutual fund’s risk-adjusted
return, which leads to a lower optimal ratio of mutual fund holdings, a higher selling
ratio, and by definition, a higher turnover ratio. The predominant effect should be 
singled out empirically. 
2. Hypothesis B: How do costs and uncertainty influence the buying ratio?
Following an argument similar to that in hypothesis A, trading costs, both front-end
loads and redemption fees, should be negatively correlated with the buying ratio.
Furthermore, the Section III results show that a downward shift of the lower 
boundary of optimal mutual fund holdings caused by an increase in front-end loads 
is larger than that caused by an increase in redemption fees. This implies that the 
buying ratio should be more sensitive to changes in front-end loads than to changes 
in redemption fees. 
On the other hand, administrative fees do not generate incentives to delay 
purchases, as trading costs do. We should note, however, that administrative 
fees diminish the net expected rate of return on mutual funds, thereby causing a
decline in the optimal ratio of mutual fund holdings. When trading costs are also
incurred, the entire optimal holding range will shift downward and the buying
ratio should fall accordingly. In particular, when mutual funds are held over 
long periods, the burden of administrative fees, which are imposed proportionally
to the length of possession, could become heavier than one-time trading costs. 
In such cases, changes in administrative fees are likely to have a significant impact
on the buying ratio.
27
An increase in uncertainty over mutual fund returns reduces the amount of 
optimal holdings for the risk-averse investor, which obviously implies a lower buying
ratio. In addition, the value of the investor’s “option to delay rebalancing” rises, so his
or her tendency to be deterred from buying mutual funds should become stronger.
To sum up, the negative response of the buying ratio to uncertainty over returns
should be evident. 
3. Hypothesis C: How do costs and uncertainty influence the selling ratio?
As is the case with hypotheses A and B, an increase in either front-end loads or
redemption fees raises the value of the “option to delay rebalancing.” This makes 
the investor more hesitant about buying or selling his or her mutual fund assets.
Hence, the selling ratio should be lowered. In particular, an increase in redemption
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27. Our numerical analyses in Section III suggest that an increase in administrative fees has a significant negative
impact on optimal mutual fund holdings when we assume an infinite investment horizon.fees has a relatively large effect on the upper boundary of optimal mutual fund 
holdings, which implies a larger negative impact on the selling ratio. 
Meanwhile, an increase in administrative fees reduces the net expected rate of
return and the optimal holding ratio accordingly, implying a greater possibility that
the investor will sell his or her mutual fund assets, or a higher selling ratio. 
The relationship between uncertainty over returns and the selling ratio is 
analogous to that described in hypothesis A. An increase in uncertainty may raise 
the value of the “option to delay rebalancing,” driving down the selling ratio.
However, the optimal ratio of mutual fund holdings for the risk-averse investor 
will fall as well, and this positively impacts the selling ratio. The predominant effect
cannot be predetermined.
28
B. Some Reservations about Our Hypotheses
A key assumption behind our hypotheses is that all the relevant costs are merely sunk
costs for mutual fund investors. However, these costs can be thought of as the price
investors are willing to pay for various services that make mutual fund holdings
appealing. Therefore, it would be unfair to disregard these positive aspects of mutual
fund costs. In this subsection, we briefly discuss two important roles the costs play to
“encourage” mutual fund holding. They are “the function of supporting a costly
search” and “the function of stabilizing portfolios.” 
1. The function of supporting a costly search 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) asserts that high-fee funds spend more on reducing search
costs that investors must bear to select appropriate funds from a pool of assets.
Information gathering is an essential process in making investment decisions, and
often a costly one for an individual investor. In this regard, buying mutual funds 
may be a solution, because the investors can free themselves to some extent from
costly search activities by choosing from a limited list of ready-made portfolios. Once
they have invested, they may enjoy affiliated services that further curtail search
efforts, such as periodic reports on the current market environment, or investment
consultation. Meanwhile, mutual funds can enjoy their scale merit in monitoring
their portfolios or gathering information. Front-end loads and administrative fees are
charged partly for such a supportive function for reducing the investor’s search costs. 
2. The function of stabilizing portfolios
According to Chordia (1996), trading costs, both front-end loads and redemption fees,
dissuade investors from selling their mutual funds. They enable fund managers to 
construct efficient portfolios. Investors who sell their mutual funds impose negative
externalities on investors who continue to hold the same funds for the following 
two reasons: (1) liquidation of securities results in unnecessary expenses, including
adverse selection costs in trading;
29 and (2) this worsens the fund performance since 
the fund managers must keep a large cash position to prepare for selling by investors.
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28. Note that our discussion contrasts with those based on the single-period CAPM, where uncertainty over returns
is assumed to be positively correlated with the selling ratio. We think such arguments are oversimplified in the
dynamic context, since they neglect the former effect we explained. 
29. These costs are, broadly, the profits raised by non-informed traders to compensate for losses from trading with
informed traders. See Glosten and Milgrom (1985) for more details.One effective way to deal with the negative externalities is to dissipate liquidity risk by
having a large body of investors. Another way is to impose trading costs, which we will
discuss below. 
When an investor needs liquidity, the investor will employ the less cost-bearing
method by comparing the cost incurred by selling mutual funds with that of alter-
native funding means. Imposition of trading costs on the fund will raise the former
cost, thereby dissuading the investor from selling the fund to meet his or her liquidity
demand. Furthermore, when there exists information asymmetry between funds and
investors about the investors’ selling possibilities, discriminating trading costs among
mutual funds can yield more efficient equilibrium than the case of uniform trading
costs. To be specific, it can induce self-selection on the side of investors in the sense
that high-liquidity-risk investors choose low-fee and less efficient funds and vice
versa. Successful structuring of trading costs yields a separating equilibrium. 
Considering the positive aspects of mutual fund costs we discussed above, we
should add the following reservations: 
(1) As long as investors think that front-end loads and administrative fees are
charged to compensate for investment services, they may not consider them
mere sunk costs. As Sirri and Tufano (1998) argue, raising incentives of sales
companies to market mutual funds can lead to a decline in investors’ search
costs.
30,31 Such effects may dilute the relationship we discussed between trading
costs and mutual fund trading behavior.
(2) Since front-end loads and redemption fees dissuade investors from selling
mutual funds, they enable fund managers to construct more efficient port-
folios by keeping cash reserves as minimal as possible. This implies upward
pressure to the optimal ratio of mutual fund holding, partially offsetting the
effects assumed in hypothesis B. 
C. Estimating the Empirical Model
This subsection formulates regression models. The independent variables
32 are variances
of the rates of return,
33,34 front-end loads, redemption fees,
35 administrative fees, and
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30. According to Sirri and Tufano (1998), if high mutual fund fees effectively reduce investors’ search costs, the 
negative correlation between fees and fund flows should be mitigated. They tested this null-hypothesis and 
concluded that the hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
31. In Japan’s case, it is said that high front-end loads were an incentive of sales companies such as securities 
companies to conduct heavy marketing, encouraging investors to trade mutual funds as frequently as possible.
This practice might lead to excessive turnover ratios. We will return to this issue later. 
32. The studies examining mutual fund flows generally include some measures of each fund’s expected returns in
their model (see Remolona, Kleiman, and Gruenstein [1997] and Sirri and Tufano [1998] for examples). Our
simulation results show that expected returns may indeed have a significant impact on investment behavior.
However, we exclude expected returns from our regression models to (1) focus on the effects of uncertainty 
and costs, both of which create a dynamics of investment behavior; (2) keep the model as simple as possible; and
(3) avoid arbitrariness entailing estimation of expected returns. 
33. The rate of return is defined as ln(fundpricet/fundpricet−1).
34. As mentioned in Footnote 6, it is not the ex ante volatility that is important, but uncertainty over future perform-
ance. However, as the difference between the historical volatility (HV) and the conditional volatility estimated by
the GARCH model is not large, we use the HV to avoid additional assumptions. 
35. We take natural logs of front-end loads and redemption fees, since our simulation results imply a non-linear 
relationship between these costs and fund flow indicators. dummy variables that take one if the mutual funds can be bought at the bank counter
and take zero otherwise.
36,37 The dependent variables are three indices of mutual 
fund flows, (1) the turnover ratio, (2) the buying ratio, and (3) the selling ratio. 
The equations we estimate are as follows (see Table 3 for details of variables):
Rit
TRS = a 0 +a 1VAR it + a2ln(Fi
ENT) + a3ln(Fi
EXT) + a4Fi
RUN + a5Bi +uit, (24)
Rit
ENT = a 0 +a 1VAR it + a2ln(Fi
ENT) + a3ln(Fi
EXT) + a 4Fi
RUN + a5Bi + uit, (25)
Rit
EXT = a0 + a1VAR it + a2ln(Fi
ENT) + a 3ln(Fi
EXT) + a4Fi
RUN + a5Bi + uit. (26)
Also, we estimate equations excluding the administrative fee Fi
RUN from the right-hand
sides
38 of the above equations. 
Rit
TRS = a 0 +a 1VAR it + a2ln(Fi
ENT) + a 3ln(Fi
EXT) + a5Bi +uit, (27)
Rit
ENT = a 0 +a 1VAR it + a2ln(Fi
ENT) + a3ln(Fi
EXT) + a5Bi + uit, (28)
Rit
EXT = a0 + a1VAR it + a2ln(Fi
ENT) + a 3ln(Fi
EXT) + a 5Bi + uit. (29)
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36. Nikami (2001a) calculates a correlation between fund flows and the stock index for each sales channel. He 
found a positive correlation in the case of fund flows via securities companies, and a negative correlation for 
fund flows via banks. Therefore, we add a dummy variable to control for qualitative differences depending on
sales channels.
37. Since our data set includes index and global equity funds, we estimated a model with dummy variables 
discriminating the fund type. None of them proved to be statistically significant, however.
38. We exclude administrative fees Fi
RUN for the following reasons. First, our hypotheses suggest that the coefficient of
administrative fees should not be statistically significant in model A. Second, we found a relatively high correla-
tion, around 0.7, between the administrative fee and the front-end loads, which possibly incurs multicollinearity.
For details, see the correlation matrix in Table 3.The signs for each coefficient implied by hypotheses A to C and the estimation
results of the panel data analysis are summarized in Table 4.
D. Empirical Results 
Empirical results are reported in Tables 5, 6, and 7. The Lagrange multiplier (LM) 
specification test results
39 show that the random effects model is more suitable than the
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Mean 0.270 0.145 0.126 3.196 2.465 0.129 1.254





VARit 1 0.282 0.098 0.100
Fi





Table 3  Details of Variables
[1] Dependent Variables
Rit
ENT : Buying ratio of mutual fund i in period t (yen amount of mutual funds bought/net asset
value, average of the previous five business days) 
Rit
EXT : Selling ratio of mutual fund i in period t (yen amount of mutual funds sold/net asset
value, average of the previous five business days)
Rit




VARit : Variance of the rate of return on mutual fund i (calculated for the previous 60 days,
annualized) 
Fi
ENT : 1 + front-end loads on mutual fund i
1
Fi
EXT : 1 + redemption fees on mutual fund i
Fi
RUN : Administrative fees on mutual fund i (annualized) 
Bi : Dummy for funds that hold bank selling routes (funds that hold the routes = 1, otherwise = 0)
uit : Error term
[3] Data
Sample period: August 2000 to end-July 2001 (daily data) 
Sample size: 91 open-end equity mutual funds, comprising 75 general domestic equity funds,
6 index funds, and 10 general global equity funds. The sample funds were the 91
largest funds in terms of outstanding net asset value at the end of March 2001.
2
Notes: 1. We add one to the actual figures so that we can take logs when the cost is zero. 
2. We omitted mutual funds that had missing data or recorded no changes, i.e., no buying or
selling occurred in the sample period. The aggregate net asset value of our sample funds at
the end of March 2001 was ¥4.6 trillion. This accounts for 31.9 percent of the total mutual
fund industry (¥14.5 trillion), covering most of the major funds. 
3. Figures in this table are shown as 100 times the original. 
39. We use an LM test devised by Breusch and Pagan (1980) for testing the random effects model against the pooled
OLS model. See Greene (2000) for details.
[4] Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
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[1] Regression Results
N = 91 (number of funds), T = 247 (period analyzed, from August 1, 2000 to July 31, 2001), NT = 22,477
Pooled OLS  Pooled OLS
One-way One-way Two-way Two-way
(1) (2)
random effect  random effect  random effect  random effect 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
a1
0.00853 0.00736 –0.00648 –0.00655 –0.01070 –0.01079
[6.126***] [5.306***] [–2.803***] [–2.834***] [–3.880***] [–3.910***]
a2
–0.00121 –0.00206 –0.00136 –0.00210 –0.00140 –0.00211
[–7.198***] [–15.653***] [–1.260] [–2.460**] [–1.297] [–2.468**]
a3
–0.00092 –0.00211 –0.00127 –0.00188 –0.00123 –0.00181
[–6.261***] [–9.986***] [–0.870] [–1.385] [–0.84] [–1.331]
a4
–0.00092 — –0.00080 — –0.00076 —
[–8.200***] [–1.105] [–1.055]
a5
0.0011 0.00111 0.00114 0.00113 0.00114 0.00113
[16.160***] [15.952***] [2.539**] [2.501**] [2.543**] [2.507**]
a0 (constant) 0.00480 0.00480 0.00529 0.00526 0.00543 0.00540
[28.346***] [28.298***] [5.010***] [4.958***] [5.118***] [5.070***]
R-squared 0.027 0.023 0.027 0.024 0.027 0.024
Note: Figures in brackets show t-values.  ** denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level, and *** at the 
1 percent level.
Table 5  Regression Results A
Model A 1: Rit
TRS = a0 + a1VARit + a2ln(Fi
ENT) + a3ln(Fi
EXT) + a4Fi
RUN + a5Bi + uit
2: Rit
TRS = a0 + a1VARit + a2ln(Fi
ENT) + a3ln(Fi
EXT) + a5Bi + uit
[2] Specification Tests
Model (1) Model (2)
One-way Two-way One-way Two-way
LM (Lagrange multiplier) test
66,181.13*** 68,535.23*** 66,589.77*** 68,968.51*** (Pooled OLS vs. random effect, H0:  u
2 =  v
2 = 0)
Note: Figures show LM statistics. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
Table 4  Sign of Coefficients
[1] Sign of Coefficients Implied by Our Model
a1 a2 Magnitude a3 a4
Hypothesis (model) A ±− −
Hypothesis (model) B −−<−−
Hypothesis (model) C ±−>−+
Note: Hypotheses A to C are tested by models A to C, respectively.
[2] Sign of Coefficients Verified Empirically
a1 a2 Magnitude a3 a4
Hypothesis (model) A (1) −− −
(2) −− −
Hypothesis (model) B (1) −−>−−
(2) −−>−
Hypothesis (model) C (1) −−<++
(2) −−<+
Note: Shadows represent significance at the 10 percent level.115
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pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model for all our models.
40 Therefore, we focus on
the coefficients of the random effects models, which corresponds to the shaded area. 
First, let us see the results of hypothesis A. In the model including administrative
fees, neither the coefficient sign of front-end loads nor redemption fees is statistically
significant, although the signs for both of the coefficients are consistent with our
hypothesis. Meanwhile, we cannot reject the null-hypothesis that the coefficient of
administrative fees is zero, as our model suggests. On the other hand, when we 
exclude administrative fees, the significance level improves for coefficients of front-end
loads and redemption fees. In particular, the coefficient of front-end loads becomes 
significant at the 5 percent level. Furthermore, the coefficient of uncertainty over 
fund returns is significantly negative, which can be interpreted as evidence of the
investor’s “option to delay rebalancing.” The dummy variables indicating funds with 
a bank sales channel are significant at the 1 percent level for all models. Thus, the 
prevailing observation of a qualitative difference in fund flows between the bank 
sales channel and other channels is also supported.
[1] Regression Results
N = 91 (number of funds), T = 247 (period analyzed, from August 1, 2000 to July 31, 2001), NT = 22,477
Pooled OLS  Pooled OLS
One-way One-way Two-way Two-way
(1) (2)
random effect  random effect  random effect  random effect 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
a1
0.00652 0.00501 –0.00326 –0.00339 –0.00424 –0.00439
[6.313***] [4.862***] [–1.899*] [–1.969**] [–2.161**] [–2.238**]
a2
–0.00009 –0.00119 –0.00019 –0.00121 –0.00020 –0.00121
[–0.731] [–12.136***] [–0.242] [–1.913*] [–0.254] [–1.915*]
a3
–0.00156 –0.00244 –0.00146 –0.00230 –0.00145 –0.00229
[–9.259***] [–15.550***] [–1.374] [–2.286**] [–1.363] [–2.266**]
a4
–0.00119 — –0.00110 — –0.00110 —
[–14.214***] [–2.103**] [–2.084**]
a5
0.00140 0.00139 0.00141 0.00140 0.00141 0.00140
[27.199***] [26.760***] [4.329***] [4.174***] [4.324***] [4.172***]
a0 (constant) 0.00249 0.00249 0.00281 0.00277 0.00284 0.00280
[19.853***] [19.754***] [3.660***] [3.518***] [3.690***] [3.552***]
R-squared 0.049 0.041 0.049 0.041 0.049 0.041
Note: Figures in brackets show t-values. * denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent
level, and *** at the 1 percent level.
Table 6  Regression Results B
Model B 1: Rit
ENT = a0 + a1VARit + a2ln(Fi
ENT) + a3ln(Fi
EXT) + a4Fi
RUN + a5Bi + uit
2: Rit
ENT = a0 + a1VARit + a2ln(Fi
ENT) + a3ln(Fi
EXT) + a5Bi + uit
[2] Specification Tests
Model (1) Model (2)
One-way Two-way One-way Two-way
LM (Lagrange multiplier) test
61,063.01*** 67,760.87*** 61,144.11*** 67,836.97*** (Pooled OLS vs. random effect, H0:  u
2 =  v
2 = 0)
Note: Figures show LM statistics. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
40. We disregard the fixed effects model because it fails to identify time-invariant mutual fund costs, which play an
important part in our model.Next, let us turn to hypothesis B. In the model including administrative fees, 
the coefficient signs of front-end loads and redemption fees are consistent with the
hypothesis, but they are not significant. When we exclude administrative fees, the
coefficients of these costs become significant, although we fail to verify the relative
magnitude that our hypothesis predicts. The coefficient of administrative fees is 
significantly negative, which is consistent with our model. We should note, however,
that the magnitude of the coefficient is rather small compared with the coefficients of
other costs. Finally, the coefficient of uncertainty over fund returns supports our
hypothesis in every model, showing significantly negative values. 
Last, we examine hypothesis C. Table 7 shows that the selling ratio and front-end
loads have a significantly negative correlation as is implied by the hypothesis.
Meanwhile, we cannot observe any significant relationship with redemption fees or
administrative fees. In more detail, signs for the latter coefficient are consistent with
the theory, but the latter did not satisfy our predictions. The coefficient of uncer-
tainty is significantly negative in all models, implying the presence of the “option to
delay rebalancing,” or dynamic optimization behavior in mutual fund trading.
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[1] Regression Results
N = 91 (number of funds), T = 247 (period analyzed, from August 1, 2000 to July 31, 2001), NT = 22,477
Pooled OLS  Pooled OLS
One-way One-way Two-way Two-way
(1) (2)
random effect  random effect  random effect  random effect 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
a1
0.00201 0.00235 –0.00297 –0.00292 –0.00534 –0.00527
[2.388**] [2.797***] [–2.082**] [–2.050**] [–3.190***] [–3.147***]
a2
–0.00112 –0.00087 –0.00117 –0.00089 –0.00119 –0.00089
[–10.992***] [–10.964***] [–2.210**] [–2.142**] [–2.253**] [–2.153**]
a3
0.00014 0.00033 0.00019 0.00042 0.00021 0.00046
[0.994**] [2.603***] [0.260] [0.633] [0.292] [0.690]
a4
–0.00026 — 0.00030 — 0.00032 —
[3.857***] [0.859] [0.914]
a5
–0.00028 –0.000027 –0.00027 –0.00027 –0.00027 –0.00027
[–6.607***] [–6.518***] [–1.244] [–1.226] [–1.231] [–1.213]
a0 (constant) 0.00231 0.00231 0.00247 0.00248 0.00255 0.00256
[22.511***] [22.507***] [4.773***] [4.812***] [4.903***] [4.941***]
R-squared 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008
Note: Figures in brackets show t-values. ** denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level, and *** at the 
1 percent level.
Table 7  Regression Results C
Model C 1: Rit
EXT = a0 + a1VARit + a2ln(Fi
ENT) + a3ln(Fi
EXT) + a4Fi
RUN + a5Bi + uit
2: Rit
EXT = a0 + a1VARit + a2ln(Fi
ENT) + a3ln(Fi
EXT) + a5Bi + uit
[2] Specification Tests
Model (1) Model (2)
One-way Two-way One-way Two-way
LM (Lagrange multiplier) test
27,369.71*** 27,660.14*** 27,706.19*** 27,995.77*** (Pooled OLS vs. random effect, H0:  u
2 =  v
2 = 0)
Note: Figures show LM statistics. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level.V. Empirical Implications 
From our empirical analyses, we conclude that our results generally support the
hypotheses proposed in Section IV.
41 In this section, we summarize the implications
of our empirical results.
First, Japanese investors basically consider mutual fund fees as sunk costs, even
though these costs have such positive effects on mutual fund holdings as reducing
investor search costs or stabilizing the fund portfolios.
42
Second, mutual fund investors on the whole seem to exhibit rational trading 
behavior as implied by our dynamic asset allocation model. Anecdotal episodes say that
sales companies in Japan have traditionally encouraged investors to frequently switch
from one fund to another, which enables sales companies to enjoy front-end load
income from high turnover ratios. If this trend still exists, we should observe a positive
correlation
43 between front-end loads and fund flow measures. Our results show that
fund flow measures have a statistically significant negative correlation with front-end
loads. This could be a sign of improvement in investors’ sub-optimal trading behavior,
at least during the sample period. However, the fact that the absolute value of the 
coefficient of administrative fees is not larger than that of other fees may suggest that
investors have yet to fully understand the accumulative burden of ongoing costs 
associated with long-term investment. After all, the concept of asset management has
just started to take root in Japan, and it will take some time for investors to assimilate
the necessary knowledge in making proper investment decisions.
44
Third, the results may suggest an alternative explanation for the current sluggish-
ness in the Japanese equity mutual fund market. During the sample period, starting
from the middle of 2000, investors seemed to be hesitant to purchase mutual funds as
a result of their dynamically optimal trading behavior. The existence of trading costs is
likely to prompt investors to delay their investment decisions under uncertainty. Where
there is downward pressure on prices, as in current Japanese equity funds, investors
rationally delay purchases until their mutual fund holdings hit the lower boundary of
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41. Note, however, that the results should be interpreted with some caution for the following reasons. First, the influ-
ence of redemption fees on investment behavior is not straightforward. Investors may not find redemption fees to
be significant, as they are small for most mutual funds, ranging from zero to about 0.5 percent. Second, although
cost figures are taken from the prospectus, these may not be the actual costs, given that an increasing number of
funds have begun to waive their fees. For example, some funds offer discounts or rebates on front-end loads as a
reward to long-term holding, while others charge additional performance-based fees. Christoffersen (2001) points
out that the practice of fee waiving in the United States is an effective method to set flexible performance-based
fees, circumventing the sub-optimal fixed fee structure of the industry. The same can also be noted for Japan.
Nikami (2001b) suggests that funds usually prefer not to change contractual fees, since it will involve the 
cumbersome procedure of changing the prospectus.
42. Some point out that Japanese customers have a strong tendency to regard services as free, so they are not 
accustomed to paying for such services as investment consultation.
43. Sales companies have a greater incentive to promote the sale of funds that allow them to receive higher loads.
Hence, positive correlation between front-end loads and the buying ratio is expected. Furthermore, the fact that
investors have been encouraged to switch from one fund to another implies that selling and buying usually go
hand in hand. Needless to say, such relations contrast sharply with the dynamic optimal trading behavior we 
discussed in this paper. 
44. The relatively small value of the coefficients of administrative fees may be ascribed to views that the fees 
compensate for high-quality services. But we do not think such an explanation is plausible, because it contradicts
our results that the coefficients of front-end loads are significantly negative. the optimal holding range. This will directly lead to lackluster demand for equity
mutual funds. The upward trend in both costs and uncertainty over returns, which we
showed in Section I, should amplify this mechanism.
45
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper provided both theoretical and empirical analyses of market participants’
optimal decision-making in trading Japanese equity mutual funds. First, we built an
intertemporal decision-making model that incorporated trading costs. This setting
enabled us to shed light on investors’ options to delay investment or the investors’
waiting option. A comparative analysis showed that an increase in uncertainty over
the rate of mutual fund returns had a negative impact not only on market partici-
pants’ buying behavior, but also on their selling behavior. Also, depending on the
degree of uncertainty over returns, a several percentage point increase in trading costs
was likely to change the optimal share of mutual funds in investors’ portfolios, by up
to 10 percentage points. These results cannot be obtained by analyses based on the 
single-period CAPM. 
The merits of long-term investment seem to be over-emphasized recently in Japan,
probably as a negative reaction to the fact that sales companies tended to encourage
investors to heavily engage in short-term trades. However, we think that the ideal
investor is not the one who simply buys and blindly holds a mutual fund over a long
period, but the one who can flexibly adjust his or her portfolio allocations, depending
on the market environment. In this sense, the investment strategy specified in this paper
may be regarded as an ideal asset management policy for individual investors.
Second, we empirically examined the above theoretical implications using daily
transaction data of selected equity mutual funds in Japan. By estimating a panel data
model, we concluded that at least for the sample period from August 2000 to July 2001,
investment behavior has been rational. Our results may also provide a new explanation
for the sluggishness in equity mutual funds trading after the bursting of the bubble
economy. Investors are likely to be rationally postponing their purchases of equity
mutual funds or exercising their waiting option under the present circumstances of low
expected returns, higher degree of uncertainty, and high trading costs. 
Finally, we should mention that our theoretical model should be interpreted with
care due to its simplified assumptions, such as introduction of a fixed consumption
rule, and tractable asset dynamics. As for the empirical analyses, we may not have
been able to completely grasp the actual costs, since we used the contractual value of
mutual fund fees due to the limitation of data. Furthermore, this paper focuses on
the domestic demand structure of mutual funds. Thus, international comparisons are
left for future research. 
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45. As mentioned before, conventional CAPM analyses suggest that greater uncertainty leads to increased selling 
of funds.APPENDIX: COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH EQUITY MUTUAL FUNDS
Appendix Table 1 shows six types of explicit fees associated with trading and holding
equity mutual funds: front-end loads, administrative fees, managing fees, redemption
fees, sales fees, and taxes (in addition, there are brokerage fees associated with trading
mutual funds). Front-end loads can be thought of as service fees that sales companies
charge investors when selling mutual funds (some funds offer no-load products, where
front-end loads are zero, but front-end loads for domestic equity mutual funds 
average 2 to 3 percent). Administrative and managing fees are deducted from mutual
funds on a daily basis during the period that investors hold funds. The fees are usually
a fixed percentage of net assets. The receivers of the fees are the sales company, the
investment trust company, and the trustee. The percentage received by the sales 
company is the price paid by investors for information and for handling the dividend
payout. The percentage received by the investment trust company is the fee paid 
for costs such as administration and research, portfolio management, accounting, 
computer processing, personnel, and disclosure. The percentage received by the trustee
is the price for delivery of securities and cash, custody and management of securities,
and bookkeeping of the transactions. 
Investors pay redemption fees and sales fees when selling mutual funds. Redemption
fees are set to defray fund costs associated with investor redemption and paid directly
to the fund. Thus, from a seller’s perspective, they are purely sunk costs. Sales fees are
also charged when investors sell mutual funds, but since only few mutual funds charge
them, we will not consider them in this paper. Therefore, the costs we incorporate in
our model are (1) front-end loads and redemption fees charged proportionally to the
amount of transaction and (2) administrative fees charged on the net asset value. 
Taxes, in the case of general open-end mutual funds, are charged as a 20 percent
withholding tax when dividends are paid out, and when capital gains are realized
from sales of mutual fund assets. For simplicity, we will also not consider these taxes.
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Appendix Table 1  Costs Associated with Equity Mutual Funds
Relevant period Fees, etc. Receiver entities
Funds are bought Front-end loads Sales company
Funds are held Administrative fees Sales company
Investment company
Trustee
Managing fees Investment company
Funds are sold Redemption fees, sales fees Mutual fund
Dividends are paid Taxes (income tax, local tax)
Funds are sold
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